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An alternative history of the Continental Dollar is constructed from the original 
resolutions passed by Congress. The Continental Dollar was a zero-interest bearer bond, 
not a fiat currency. The public could redeem it at face value in specie at fixed future 
dates. Being a zero-interest bearer bond, discounting must be separated from 
depreciation. Before 1779 there was no depreciation, only discounting. In 1779 and again 
in 1780 Congress passed ex post facto laws which altered the redemption dates of past 
Continental Dollars in ways that were not fiscally credible. These laws were the turning 
point. Depreciation and collapse followed. 
 
 
The United States Congress financed the War for Independence (1775-83) by issuing 
paper money—the Continental Dollar. From 1775 through 1779, new emissions totaled $200 
million in face value and accounted for 77 percent of congressional spending. No new emissions 
occurred after November 1779.
1  The traditional history of the Continental Dollar treats it as a 
fiat currency. As outstanding emissions accumulated, the Continental Dollar depreciated and 
prices rose. In 1781, having run its course as an inflation tax, it was abandoned.
2 
An alternative history of the Continental Dollar is offered here. Three points are made. 
First, the Continental Dollar was not a fiat currency, but a zero-interest bearer bond. The par 
value of a Continental Dollar was not its face value but its present value, namely its face value 
reduced by time-discounting from its fixed future redemption (maturity) date. Second, when  
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time-discounting is distinguished from depreciation, no depreciation occurred before 1779. Many 
contemporaries, as well as subsequent scholars, mistook time-discounting for depreciation.  
Third, Congress changed the redemption rules in 1779 and again in 1780 in ways that were not 
fiscally credible. Depreciation, as opposed to time-discounting, and the collapse of the 
Continental Dollar monetary system followed shortly thereafter. 
Initial Design and Ideal Performance 
  In a series of resolutions from 22 June through 26 December 1775, Congress determined 
the amounts and the structural design of the first two emissions of Continental Dollars, see Table 
1. Congress maintained this structural design in all subsequent emissions, changing only the 
amounts issued and denominational spacing. Congressional debates were private and the 
delegates were sworn to secrecy. Why Congress structured the Continental Dollar the way they 
did must be deduced from their actions.
3 
For the first emission, the first three million—those with the date May 10, 1775 printed 
on the bills, Congress passed redemption instructions on 29 July 1775. States were to remit fixed 
quotas of Continental Dollars to the Continental treasury to be burned. Each state's quota was 
roughly proportional to its respective population share in the union. Congress explicitly left each 
state free to decide how best to redeem Continental Dollars from the citizens within its 
jurisdiction. State remittances to the Continental treasury were to be in four equal yearly 
installments spread over a contiguous four-year period, beginning on 30 November 1779 and 
ending on 30 November 1782. No contemporaneous taxes or other debts payable to the states in 
these Continental Dollars were required before the redemption years indicated. No state was 
required to remit more than its quota, and Continental Dollars paid no interest. States with a  
                                                 
 
3 Journals of the Continental Congress [JCC hereafter] (v. 2-3). The private letters written by congressmen 
reveal little (Smith 1976, v. 1-2).   3
Table 1   Continental Dollar Redemption/Maturity Dates Set by Congressional Legislation  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Procedural Date  Printed    Stated Specie 
Authorization  on the Bill       Redemption        Current New  Applied to Other  
Dates    (Emission #)   Option   Redemption/Maturity Dates  Emission  Emissions 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
July 29, 1775  May 10, 1775  yes  ¼ on or before Nov. 30, 1779    $1,000,000  $2,000,000 from 
    (Emission 1)    ¼ on or before Nov. 30, 1780      22 June 1775 
     ¼  on  or  before  Nov.  30,  1781 
¼ on or before Nov. 30, 1782 
Dec. 26, 1775  Nov. 29, 1775  yes  ¼ on or before Nov. 30, 1783    $3,000,000   
    (Emission 2)     ¼ on or before Nov. 30, 1784 
¼ on or before Nov. 30, 1785 
¼ on or before Nov. 30, 1786 
Feb. 21, 1776  Feb. 17, 1776  ---  nothing          $4,000,000   
  (Emission  3)         [$3,937,220  printed  only] 
May 22, 1776  May 9, 1776  yes
a  “in such manner…as Congress    $5,000,000   
  (Emission  4)   shall  hereafter  direct…”
a      
Aug. 13, 1776  July 22, 1776  yes
a  “         $5,000,000   
  (Emission  5) 
Nov. 2, 1776  Nov. 2, 1776  ---  “          $5,000,000 
  (Emission  6) 
Feb. 26, 1777  Feb. 26, 1777  ---  “periods...that shall be fixed    $5,000,000   
  (Emission  7)   by  Congress...”
a 
May 22, 1777  May 20, 1777  ---  nothing          $5,000,000   
  (Emission  8) 
Aug. 15, 1777    “    ---  “          $1,000,000   
 
Nov. 7, 1777    “    ---  “          $1,000,000   
 
Dec. 3, 1777    “    ---  “          $1,000,000 
 
Jan. 8, 1778    “    ---  “          $1,000,000 
 
Jan. 22, 1778    “    ---  “          $2,000,000 
 
Feb. 16, 1778    “    ---  “          $2,000,000 
 
Mar.  5,  1778      “   ---  “         $2,000,000 
 
Apr. 4, 1778    “     ---  “          $1,000,000 
 
Apr. 11, 1778  Apr. 11, 1778  ---  “          $5,000,000 
  (Emission  9) 
Apr. 18, 1778  May 20, 1777  ---  “             $500,000 
 
May 22, 1778  Apr. 11, 1778  ---  “          $5,000,000 
 
June  20,  1778      “   ---  “         $5,000,000 
 
July 30, 1778    “    ---  “          $5,000,000 
 
Sept. 5, 1778    “    ---  “          $5,000,000 
 
   4
Sept. 26, 1778  Sept. 26, 1778  ---  “        $10,000,100 
  (Emission  10) 
Nov.  4,  1778      “   ---  “     $10,000,100 
 
Dec.  14,  1778      “   ---  “     $10,000,100 
 
Jan.  2, 1779  Jan. 14, 1779  yes
b  $15,000,000 for 1779 and     $8,500,400  applies to all  
  (Emission  11)     annually  $6,000,000  for  18   prior  emissions 
     years to 1 January 1797, with      and to all 
   any  additional  emissions  in   subsequent 
   1779  redeemed  in  the  same   emissions  to 
manner and within the same      1780 
time period
c  
Feb. 3, 1779  Jan. 14, 1779
d yes
b  nothing new added      $5,000,160 
 
Feb. 19, 1779    “    yes
b   “        $5,000,160 
 
April 1, 1779    “    yes
b   “        $5,000,160 
 
May 5, 1779    “    yes
b   “    $10,000,100 
 
June 4, 1779    “    yes
b   “    $10,000,100 
 
July 17, 1779    “    yes
b   “    $15,000,280 
 
Sept. 17, 1779    “    yes
b   “    $15,000,260 
 
Oct. 14, 1779    “    yes
b   “        $5,000,180 
 
Nov. 17, 1779    “    yes
b   “    $10,050,540 
 
Nov. 29, 1779    “    yes
b   “    $10,000,140 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Source: Grubb (2008a, p. 286); JCC (v. 2, pp. 103, 105, 207, 221-3; v. 3, pp. 390, 398, 407, 457-9; v. 4, pp. 
157, 164-5, 339-40, 374, 380-3; v. 5, pp. 599, 651, 724-8; v. 6, p. 918; v. 7, p. 161; v. 8, pp. 377-80, 646-7; v. 9, pp. 
873-4, 993; v. 10, pp. 26, 28, 36, 82-3, 86, 174-5, 223-5, 308-12, 337-8, 364-5; v. 11, p. 521-4, 627, 731-2; v. 12, 
pp. 884, 962, 967, 1073, 1100-01, 1133, 1217-18, 1266; v. 13, pp. 19-21, 64-5, 139-41, 209-10, 408-9, 420-1; v. 14, 
pp. 548-9, 683-4, 687-8, 847-9; v. 15, pp. 1076-8, 1171-2, 1285, 1324-5); Papers of the Continental Congress 
(m247, reel 33, item 26, 'Reports of the Committee on the Treasury and Finance, 1776-1788', pp. 1-5, 13-14; m247, 
reel 145, item 136, 'Reports of the Board of Treasury, 1776-1781, Volumes 1-2 (1776-1778)', v. 1, pp. 181, 355-7, 
462, 507; v. 2, pp. 29, 83, 125, 199, 217, 373, 427, 529, 573, 669, 761; m247, reel 146, item 136, 'Reports of the 
Board of Treasury, 1776-1781, Volume III 1779', pp. 69, 111, 209, 215, 351, 477, 641, 727, 817, 845).  
 Notes: Dates are for when procedural details were given for each emission. An emission is all bills issued 
with the same date printed on the bill (Newman 1997, pp. 58-69). The date printed on the bill was the only way the 
public could distinguish between bills of different emissions and hence between bills with different redemption 
procedures. Some emissions had several authorizing resolutions in terms of when additional amounts were added to 
an emission. 
 a  Stated in coinage rating resolutions but not in emission resolutions (JCC v. 4, pp. 339-40, 382; v. 5, p. 
724; v. 7, p. 36). 
 b  See fn. 23. 
 c  By the end of 1779 a total of $199,990,000 net new Continental Dollar had been emitted. To redeem all 
the Continental Dollars as the 2 January 1779 resolution specified would entail raising the annual payments over the 
18 year period from 1780 to 1797 from $6,000,000 to $10,277,778.    5
 d  Some bills belonged to emission #10. 
 
 
quota deficiency of Continental Dollars were to make it up in specie. The Continental treasurer 
was to retain this specie and advertise its availability. Citizens with Continental Dollars in states 
that had filled their quotas and had ceased redeeming Continental Dollars could redeem them at 
face value in specie directly from the Continental treasury, in effect claiming the specie remitted 
by the states with a deficiency of Continental Dollars.
4  For the second emission, the second 
three million—those with the date November 29, 1775 printed on the bills, Congress passed 
redemption instructions on 26 December 1775 that were identical to those for the first emission, 
except that the four-year redemption period was moved forward to begin after the last of the first 
emission was redeemed, namely to begin on 30 November 1783 and end on 30 November 1786.
5  
In short, the Continental Dollar was a zero-interest bearer bond. 
  Congress' redemption instructions were widely disseminated. Congress circulated a 
handbill that contained its Continental Dollar resolutions passed before 30 July 1775.
6  This 
handbill was reprinted in numerous newspapers—the first being in the Connecticut Journal, & 
New-Haven Post-Boy, 25 October 1775. Between 25 October and 4 December 1775 all three 
newspapers in Connecticut, three of the four in Massachusetts, one of the two in Rhode Island, 
one of the four in New York, and two of the five in Pennsylvania reprinted it. Out of the 
surviving newspapers consulted, 10 of the 24 reprinted the handbill.
7  The redemption 
procedures covering the second emission were reprinted in The Pennsylvania Evening Post, 12 
March 1776. This information was also disseminated when Congress published its journals at the 
                                                 
 
4 JCC (v. 2, pp. 221-3). 
 
5 JCC (v. 3, pp. 457-9). 
 
6 United States, Continental Congress (Philadelphia?: s.n. 1775) 
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7 Grubb (2011).   6
end of 1775 and later in 1776.
8  The public was well informed of the structural design of the 
Continental Dollar. 
For the next eight emissions, totaling $95,500,300, no explicit redemption instructions 
were issued.
9  The pattern of redemption for these eight emissions, however, could be deduced 
from the pattern set by Congress for the first two emissions. This pattern set redemptions far into 
the future, with redemption intervals consistent with feasible and historically acceptable tax 
rates. Across the first two emissions, the redemption of just $750,000 each year implied a tax 
rate per capita per year of $0.33. In the 13 colonies between 1770 and 1774, the average tax rate 
per white-capita per year for all taxes was $0.41.
10 
The forward-shifting contiguous four-year redemption pattern across the first two 
emissions is difficult to explain except in reference to maintaining a fiscally credible per year per 
capita tax rate for retiring Continental Dollars at face value. Otherwise, a redemption interval for 
a zero-interest bearer bond creates a cumbersome medium of exchange. The present value of a 
particular Continental Dollar depends on when within its redemption interval it was expected to 
be redeemed. Redemption intervals had to be short enough to keep the present value of all 
Continental Dollars from a given emission comparable, but wide enough to execute their 
retirement at face value via taxation.  
                                                 
 
8 JCC (v. 2, p. 208; v. 3, pp. 263-4, 393, 427); Smith (1976, v. 1, p. 695). The Constitutional Gazette, 20 
December 1775; New-York Gazette and the Weekly Mercury, 25 December 1775; New-York Journal; or, The 
General Advertiser, 21 December 1775; The Pennsylvania Journal; and the Weekly Advertiser, 13 December 1775; 
and the Pennsylvania Gazette, 23 October 1776 advertised the proceedings of the Continental Congress for sale. 
 
9 After 1775, Congress shifted monetary issues from Congress, sitting as a whole, to congressional 
subcommittees. Redemption instructions for subsequent emissions fell between these administrative cracks. Not 
until emission #11 did Congress, sitting as the whole, resolve this administrative lapse. 
10 Derived from Bezanson (1951, p. 344); Boyd (1954, v. 10, pp. 42-3); Carter, et al. (2006, v. 1, p. 25; v. 
5, pp. 652-3); Grubb (2008a); McCusker (1978, p. 10); Rabushka (2008, pp. 796, 825, 862-3). Congress placed the 
redemption of the first emission four to seven years into the future because that was when the war was expected to 
be over, e.g. Silas Deane, congressman from Connecticut, wrote 1 July 1775, “The Warr will not last Seven Years if 
I have any Judgment in Matters” (Smith 1976, v. 1, p. 567). At that point, trade would resume and generate the 
income necessary to pay the taxes needed to redeem Continental Dollars at face value.   7
Using the pattern set by Congress for the first two emissions, the public could forecast the 
redemption structure for the next eight emissions. In particular, redemption would be pushed 
successively into the future for each subsequent emission. Redemption intervals would not 
overlap across emissions. Three forecasts are consistent with the redemption pattern set by 
Congress in 1775. First, a four-year contiguous redemption interval would be maintained for 
each subsequent emission (Forecast 1). Second, redemption intervals would be adjusted to 
maintain a constant $750,000 per year redemption rate (Forecast 2). Third, redemption intervals 
would be adjusted to maintain a constant per year per capita tax rate. Forecast 1 is identical to 
Forecast 2 when emission sizes are identical, which is approximately true for emissions 1 
through 7, but not thereafter. The third forecast requires forecasting population growth. Because 
it falls between Forecast 1 and Forecast 2, it is not presented separately here. 
Table 2 and Figure 1 present the ideal performance of the Continental Dollar based on its 
initial design in terms of its redemption dates, both legislated and forecasted, using a 6 percent 
discount (interest) rate.
11  Table 2 shows the present value at inception of each emission, using 
Forecast 1 for emissions 3-10. It also calculates the present value of the accumulated total 
Continental Dollars emitted to that date weighted by the dollar size of emissions, using both 
Forecast 1 and Forecast 2 for emissions 3-10. Figure 1 illustrates the present value of each 
emission from inception to maturity, collapsing the redemption interval to its last date, using 
Forecast 1 for emissions 3-7. Each emission starts at a present value well below its face value 
and then rises to its face value by its last redemption date. While a given emission's present value 
is rising over time, the addition of new emissions that start at successively lower levels pulls the 
present value of the average Continental Dollar down over time. 
                                                 
 
11 Six percent was the rate used by the national government for loans between 1776 and 1790, see Homer 
and Sylla (1991, pp. 274-313); JCC (v. 6, p. 1037; v. 7, pp. 102-3, 158; v. 9, p. 955; v. 14, pp. 717, 783; v. 16, pp. 
264-5; v. 17, p. 568); Pennsylvania Gazette (30 April; 21 and 28 May; 25 June; 2, 16, and 23 July 1777).   8
Table 2   Legislated/Forecasted Redemption Dates and Valuations for Continental Dollar Emissions  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Date Printed  Maturity/                   Thomas        Philadelphia  Implied 
On the Bills:  Redemption       Expected         Jefferson's  Philadelphia  Merchant   Tax  
Emission #   Interval         Value at
           Depreciation  Price Index:  Account Book  Rate Per 
(Amount  (L) = Legislated       Inception
a        Table
b   Derived
         Valuations  Year Per  
Referenced)  (F) = Forecasted       100 = par         100 = par  Valuation
c  100 = par  Capita
d 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
May 10, 1775  Nov. 30 1779—        63.8 - 76.8     100.0              $0.33 
    ($3,000,000)  Nov. 30, 1782 (L)    [63.8 - 76.8]    (100.0)       -----        ----- 
 
Nov. 29, 1775  Nov. 30, 1783—       51.7 - 61.9     100.0                  0.28 
    ($3,000,000)  Nov. 30, 1786 (L)    [58.7 - 70.3]    (100.0)               -----        ----- 
 
Feb. 17, 1776  Nov. 30, 1787—       41.3 - 49.5     100.0                  0.32 
    ($3,937,220)  Nov. 30, 1790 (F)      [52.3 - 62.7]    (100.0)              89.6        ----- 
            {51.7  -  62.7} 
 
May 9, 1776  Nov. 30, 1791—       32.8 - 39.3     100.0                  0.36 
    ($5,000,000)  Nov. 30, 1794 (F)      [46.1 - 55.3]      (80.0)              66.4        ----- 
            {43.2  -  54.3} 
 
July 22, 1776  Nov. 30, 1795—       25.7 - 30.7      100.0                 0.32 
    ($5,000,000)  Nov. 30, 1798 (F)      [41.6 - 49.7]      (80.0)              65.0        ----- 
            {37.0  -  47.4} 
 
Nov. 2, 1776  Nov. 30, 1799—       20.9 - 25.1      100.0
e                0.28 
    ($5,000,000)  Nov. 30, 1802 (F)    [38.0 - 45.5]       (66.7)     42.7        ----- 
            {32.5  -  41.9} 
 
Feb. 26, 1777  Nov. 30, 1803—       16.8 - 20.1           37.5
e                0.25 
    ($5,000,000)  Nov. 30, 1806 (F)      [35.1 - 42.1]       (32.3)          29.9       50.0 
            {29.0  -  37.5} 
 
May 20, 1777  Nov. 30, 1807—       13.4 - 16.1          37.5
e                0.72 
  ($16,500,000)  Nov. 30, 1810 (F)      [27.8 - 33.3]       (33.3)           20.9       40.0 
            {19.8  -  27.3} 
 
Apr. 11, 1778  Nov. 30, 1811—       11.2 - 13.3         16.7
e                    0 . 9 7  
  ($25,000,000)   Nov. 30, 1814 (F)      [22.9 - 27.4]      (20.0)            11.7       20.0 
            {13.7  -  19.5} 
 
Sept. 26, 1778  Nov. 30, 1815—         9.2 - 11.0         20.0
e                    1 . 0 3  
  ($30,000,300
f)  Nov. 30, 1818 (F)      [19.3 - 23.1]      (16.7)      11.5       20.0 
            { 9.9 - 14.2}      {25.0} 
 
Jan. 14, 1779
g  Nov. 30, 1779—       34.0 - 98.7         12.5
e                    3 . 8 2
g 
($199,990,000)  Jan. 1, 1797    (L)     [34.0 - 98.7]        (5.9)        5.6       10.0 
 
All Emissions
h  April 1780—             2.5
h          2.5
h           7 9 . 2 0  
($199,990,000)  April 1781      (L)          [2.5]         (2.0)                 0.7           1.7        1.98
i 
 
Tax Rate per White Capita per Year on Average in the 13 Colonies (all taxes), 1770-1774:        0.41 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________   9
  Sources: Table 1; Bezanson (1951, p. 344); Boyd (1954, v. 10, pp. 42-3); Bullock (1895, p. 135); Carter, et 
al. (2006, v. 1, p. 36; v. 5, p. 652); Grubb (2008a); JCC (v. 2, pp. 221-3; v. 3, pp. 457-9; v. 13, pp. 20-1; v. 16, pp. 
262-7; v. 17, pp. 567-8); Rabushka (2008, pp. 796, 825, 862-3); Webster (1969, pp. 501-2). 
 Notes: See Table 1 and the text. Forecasted amounts are based on the pattern set by the first two emissions 
that set a contiguous four-year redemption interval for each emission that started when the redemption interval for 
the immediately preceding emission ended (Forecast 1). Regarding interest rates, see fn. 11.  
 a  Continuously discounted at  6 percent off the face value on the bill from the redemption interval dates to 
the date printed on the bill expressed as the value of $100 in Continental paper money. The high-low range spans the 
redemption time interval. The numbers in brackets are the expected values for the cumulative emissions outstanding 
to that date weighted by their dollar size (Forecast 1). The numbers in { } represent an alternative forecast of the 
expected values for the cumulative emissions outstanding to that date weighted by their dollar size, namely that only 
750,000 Continental Dollars per year were to be redeemed (Forecast 2).   
 b  This is the standard depreciation reported throughout the literature, see JCC (v. 17, pp. 567-8); 
Pennsylvania Gazette (19 July 1780); United States Congress (1834, v. 2, pp. 2243-51). Jefferson  reported it as the 
number of Continental Dollars (face value) needed to equal one Spanish silver dollar (Boyd 1954, v. 10, pp. 42-3). 
That number is converted to a percentage discount off the face value expressed as the value of $100 in Continental 
paper money. The numbers in parentheses are derived from the depreciation rates reported in Bullock (1895, p. 135). 
The number in { } comes from JCC (v. 17, p. 568). 
 c  From the unweighted Philadelphia price index in Bezanson (1951, p. 344). Base prices were reset to June 
1770 through May 1775. This base price was divided by the average of the price index beginning with the month 
just after the date on the bill listed. Taking the reciprocal of that number and multiplying by 100 equals the number 
reported in the table. This process yields a comparable number in terms of expected valuation relative to par = 100, 
but in this case par equals the average base price from June 1770 through May 1775.  
 d  Population is extrapolated linearly between decadal benchmarks and is for the white population only. 
Only the tax burden needed to redeem Continental Dollars at face value is reported. Rates are expressed in Spanish 
silver dollars. Rates expressed in pounds sterling are converted to Spanish dollars following McCusker (1978, p. 
10). 
 e  Jefferson does not list all emissions nor emissions by date. Thus, some dating approximations were 
necessary.  
 f  Some emissions after 14 January 1779 also had this date on their bills. 
 g  Applies to all past and future net new emissions ($199,990,000) regardless of the date on the bill. The tax 
rate per white capita per year for this remittance structure averaged $3.82 across the redemption interval. See the 
text for how it varied over the interval. 
 h  Enacted 18 March 1780 and covered all past emissions. How to calculate the expected value at inception 
is unclear. The resolution's 40 to 1 conversion rate is used. See JCC (v. 16, pp. 262-7). 
 i  Evaluated at 40 Continental Dollars equals $1 in specie as established in the 18 March 1780 resolution. 
 
  Continental Dollars from different emissions should trade contemporaneously at different 
values. In addition, Continental Dollars from a given emission should have different values at 
different points in time. Such differences across and within emissions make for a cumbersome 
medium of exchange. Little evidence of differential treatment within and across emissions has 
been noted previously, in part because no one has looked for such and because market 
participants typically recorded monetary transactions in units of account and not media of 
exchange.
12  For example, out of 3,127 commercial advertisements placed in the Pennsylvania  
                                                 
12 Bezanson (1951, pp. 3-4, 10-11).   10
 
Figure 1  "True Par": Face Value Discounted From Final Redemption at 6 Percent for 
      Various Emissions of Continental Dollars (Forecast 1) 
 
  Sources: Tables 1 and 2.  
 Notes: The last redemption date for each redemption interval is used. For discussions of interest rates and 
legislated versus forecasted redemption dates, see Table 2 and the text. Forecast 1 sets a contiguous four-year 
redemption for each emission that starts when the redemption interval for the immediately preceding emission ends. 
Emission #11, the last emission, covers all present, past, and future emissions. The forecasted patterns for emissions 
8, 9, and 10—below and to the right of emission 7—are not drawn. 
 
 
Gazette between March 1775 and April 1780 that listed a monetary statement, only 3 percent 
referred to a particular medium of exchange.  
That said, after Congress altered the redemption rules on 2 January 1779 making the 
present value of all Continental Dollars identical regardless of emission date, a few market 
participants noted such. Edward Bonsall and Abraham Shoemaker advertised in the 27 January 
1779 Pennsylvania Gazette that they would sell a tract of land "For Continental Currency of any   11
date [italics in the original]." The implication of this previously unused phraseology is that prior 
to 2 January 1779 Continental Dollars from different emissions were treated differently when 
settling accounts.
13 
  Lack of evidence on a value distinction across emissions pre-1778 may also be due to 
Continental Dollars not being used as a medium of exchange. Table 3 shows that Continental 
Dollars were large-valued bills. The smallest emitted in 1775 was a $1 bill, equivalent in face 
value to $15 in 1990. Over 60 percent of the bills emitted in 1775 were equivalent in face value 
to, or larger than, a $50 bill in 1990. Large currency denominations were difficult to use as a 
medium of exchange. Transactions that required change could not be made unless change was 
given in some other medium. Fractional Continental Dollars were only issued in emission #3, 
early in 1776, and never again thereafter. When Congress asked the states on 22 November 1777 
to stop emitting their own paper monies, they specifically exempted small denominations, 
recognizing that such was needed for making change.
14  As the present value of Continental 
Dollars fell with subsequent emissions, the problem of making change in Continental Dollars 
was mitigated, and increasingly they could serve alone as a medium of exchange. 
  Early on, Congress may have hoped that the primary recipients of Continental Dollars, 
namely soldiers, would hold their dollars for future redemption. Soldiers' pay absorbed nearly 
half of all the Continental Dollars emitted through 1777. Congress fixed the pay of soldiers on 
the same day, 29 July 1775, that it passed the resolution establishing the Continental Dollar's 
zero-interest bearer bond structure with fixed future redemption dates. A private was paid $80 
per year. Privates were the primary recipients of military pay, receiving 78 percent of the money 
paid to each military company. British army privates were paid $55 per year. American privates,  
                                                 
13 See also the Pennsylvania Gazette (10 and 17 February; 7 and 14 April 1779). 
 
14 JCC (v. 7, p. 125; v. 9, pp. 955-6); Newman (1997, pp. 58-69, 106-10, 121-3, 170-4, 202-11, 235-40, 
255-9, 281-7, 347-56, 390-6, 415-22, 440-51).   12
Table 3   Paper Currency Pyramids: Volume and Value of Units Issued by Denomination  
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
        
Continental Dollar:        Continental Dollar:        Comparison with 
First 2 Emissions   Next 3 Emissions              U.S. Dollar Paper 
   (All in 1775)        (All in 1776)               Currency in 1990   
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
    $6 million in:    $19 million in:     Approximate  
Continental  Units  Value    Units   Value     Equivalence of      Units  Value   
Paper Dollar  Issued  Issued         Issued  Issued     1775-1776 Bills     Issued  Issued 
Denominations      %        %               %       %     in 1990 Values
a        %     % 
 
                                 $1 bill   37.8    1.9 
$1/6 bill     0.0    0.0      10.8      0.5        $2.5 bill 
$1/3 bill     0.0    0.0      10.8      1.0           $5 bill                 $5 bill     9.6    2.4 
$1/2 bill     0.0    0.0      10.8      1.6        $7.5 bill 
$2/3 bill     0.0    0.0      10.8      2.1         $10 bill               $10 bill     9.6    4.7 
   $1 bill     12.0    2.2              4.9      1.4         $15 bill               $20 bill   25.9  25.7 
   $2 bill     12.0    4.4              7.7      4.5         $30 bill 
   $3 bill     12.0    6.6           7.7      6.7         $45 bill               $50 bill     5.2  12.6 
   $4 bill     12.0    8.8        7.7      8.9         $60 bill 
   $5 bill     12.0  11.0        6.5      9.4         $75 bill 
   $6 bill     12.0  13.2        6.5    11.3         $90 bill 
   $7 bill     12.0  15.4        6.5    13.2       $105 bill             $100 bill   10.4  52.3   
   $8 bill     12.0  17.7          6.5    15.1       $120 bill   
 $20 bill       1.0    3.9        0.0      0.0       $300 bill  
 $30 bill       3.0  16.4        2.8    24.3       $450 bill 
                _____    _____    _____  _____                     ______  _____  
              100.0%   100.0%    100.0%  100.0%                          98.5%  99.6% 
_____________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  Sources: Grubb (2008a, p. 286); JCC (v. 2, pp. 103, 105, 207; v. 3, pp. 398, 407, 457-8; v. 4, pp. 157, 164-
5, 339-40, 374, 380-3; v. 5, pp. 599, 651); Newman (1997, pp. 58-63); Federal Reserve, 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/coin/data.htm. 
 a  From http://eh.net “measuring worth—relative value of U.S. Dollars” and uses the 1790 to 1990 
conversion algorithm. The Spanish silver dollar in 1790 and in 1775-6 were almost equivalent. 
 
 
however, were paid in paper Continental Dollars, whereas British privates were paid in specie. In 
November 1775, the present value of 80 Continental Dollars of the first emission was between 
$63 and $53, or comparable with the present value of a British private's yearly pay.
15 
  The strange denominational structure of Continental Dollar emissions is also consistent 
with Congress intending to pay soldiers in large bills that would be held for future redemption 
                                                 
 
15 Derived from Fortescue (1910-30, v. 4, pt. 2, p. 935); JCC (v. 2, pp. 89-90, 220-3; v. 3, pp. 322-3); 
Pennsylvania Gazette (14 August 1776); Williamson (1796, p. 27); and 
http://footguards.tripod.com/01ABOUT/01_payscale.htm (accessed 21 June 2011). Currency conversions are from 
McCusker (1978, p. 10). Relative to private's pay, the pay of upper ranks increased less in the American than in the 
British army. Thus, by-rank comparisons above private are less informative.   13
rather than spent as currency. Throughout the American colonies, as well as in modern 
economies, currency denominations were typically spaced by factors of two, three, or five, and in 
a pyramid structure with more units in the lower than in the higher denominations. These 
features reduced the transaction costs of using the currency as a medium of exchange in terms of 
making change. Table 3 shows that the denominational structure of the Continental Dollar did 
not have these features. Continental Dollar denominations were not spaced by a multiple factor, 
and the units issued had a rectangular rather than a pyramid structure.
16 
  This structure makes sense if Congress intended to pay soldiers in the fewest bills 
necessary, and thus in large-valued bills that were not intended to circulate as a currency. Three 
months pay for a private, $20, could be accommodated with one or various combinations of 
three, four, or five large-valued bills. One month's pay for a private after clothing deductions, $5, 
could be accommodated with one or various combinations of two large-valued bills. For higher 
ranked military personal, paying them with a few large-valued bills was even easier. 
  Soldiers' pay was fixed by Congress in nominal terms in July 1775. As the war continued, 
the present value of soldiers' pay when made in subsequent emissions fell. In November 1775, 
the present value of a full year's pay for an American private, when paid with dollars from the 
second emission, would be between $50 and $41—below the present value of a British private's 
yearly pay. For subsequent emissions, it was even lower. In effect, Congress was financing the 
war by extracting zero-interest borrowings from its citizen-soldiers and increasingly so as the 
war progressed. This created problems for the financing system regarding military pay over a 
long war. The problem was partially solved by the 2 January 1779 resolution that made the 
present value of all Continental Dollars the same regardless of emission date. Late in the war, 
                                                 
 
16 JCC (v. 2, pp. 220-3; v. 3, pp. 322-3); Newman (1997); Telser (1995); Van Hove (2001).   14
Congress also promised military personnel that Congress would make up "the deficiency of their 
original pay" when feasible.
17 
  After 1777, congressional payments for war supplies absorbed more Continental Dollars 
than soldiers' pay.
18  When Congress spent Continental Dollars in the marketplace for supplies 
and services, prices could be raised by suppliers and service providers to reflect the present value 
of the Continental Dollars offered in payment. Suppliers and service providers were more likely 
to re-spend the money paid them because they had subcontractors and employees they had to 
pay. Figure 2 shows that market participants in Philadelphia did not start denominating 
transactions in dollar units, above that used prior to the first emission of Continental Dollars, 
until sometime after mid-1776. By mid-1777, Congress and the public were using Continental 
Dollars as a medium of exchange.  
Discounting Versus Depreciation 
  Table 2 and Figures 3 and 4 compare the average Continental Dollar's present value with 
several measures of its purported depreciation. Between 1777 and 1779, depreciation closely 
tracks forecasted present value—they are within each other's confidence interval when 
reasonable alternative constructions and discount rates are considered. Therefore, between 1777 
and 1779 time-discounting, namely rational bond pricing, and not depreciation fully explains the 
current value of the average Continental Dollar. Between mid-1775 and 1777, however, the 
depreciation measures are above the present value calculations. This is puzzling. Before 1777, 
either the marketplace did not understand time-discounting, patriotic fervor trumped economic 
interests, or these depreciation measures pre-1777 are suspect. The latter is likely. 
  The first reports of Continental Dollars trading below face value appeared before  
                                                 
 
17 JCC (v. 15, p. 1335; v. 16, p. 344; v. 19, p. 413). 
 
18 Grubb (2008b).   15
 
Figure 2  The Prevalent Unit of Account Used in Marketplace Commercial    
    Transactions in Philadelphia, March 1775 through April 1780 
 
  Sources: Pennsylvania Gazette.  
 Notes: All commercial advertisements placed in the Pennsylvania Gazette were examined.  
 
 
Congress in Philadelphia on 23 November 1775, long before it shows up in the conventional 
measures of depreciation reported in the literature. This event occurred immediately after the 
structural design of the Continental Dollar was first reported in Pennsylvania newspapers. After 
the public was told that Continental Dollars were zero-interest bearer bonds with defined 
maturity dates, they started to accept them below their face value. This "depreciation" was 
discussed in Congress and in the newspapers through 1776. As such, the conventional measures 
of depreciation understate the extent that Continental Dollars traded below their face value    16
 
Figure 3  Value of All Continental Dollars Currently Outstanding, 1775-1780: 
    "True Par" Versus Conventional Par (Forecast 1) 
 
  Sources: Tables 1 and 2; Figure 1.  
 Notes: The "True Par" present-value lines are for the cumulative emissions outstanding to date weighted by 
their dollar size. The high-low range comes from redemption intervals. For discussions of interest rates and 





  Congress reacted to these reports of depreciation by referring the issue to committees and 
publishing admonishments against such behavior. Through 1776, however, these admonishments 
only condemned the refusal to accept Continental Dollars, not its acceptance below face value. 
Benjamin Franklin was in Congress. He had long known that the present value of a zero-interest 
bearer bond was below its face value. He had argued in Congress, unsuccessfully, for the  
                                                 
 
19 JCC (v. 3, pp. 367-8, 424, 455; v. 4, pp. 49-50, 293-4, 381-3; v. 5, pp. 608, 724-8; v. 6, p. 1046); 
Pennsylvania Gazette (17 January; 17 and 24 April; 19 June 1776).   17
 
Figure 4  Value of All Continental Dollars Currently Outstanding, 1775-1780: 
    "True Par" Versus Conventional Par (Forecast 2) 
 
  Sources: Tables 1 and 2; Figure 1.  
 Notes: See the notes to Figure 3. 
 
 
Continental Dollar to pay interest, because such would raise its present value to equal its face 
value in contemporaneous trades. As long as Franklin was in Congress, while some railed against 
depreciation as an evil and unpatriotic act, resolutions condemning depreciation, as opposed to 
just condemning non-acceptance, did not pass. Perhaps Franklin was able to convince some 
congressmen that time-discounting was not depreciation, at least through 1776.
20 
  The price index evidence in Table 2 and Figures 3 and 4 does not reflect market pricing 
                                                 
 
20 See fn. 19; Labaree (1967, v. 11, pp. 7-18); Oberg (1992, v. 29, pp. 354-6). Congress appointed Franklin 
commissioner to France on 26 September 1776 (JCC v. 5, p. 827).   18
in Continental Dollars until after 1776. The price index comes from merchant account books. In 
these books, merchants converted market transactions from whatever media of exchange were 
used into a common unit of account, namely into pounds, shillings, and pence of Pennsylvania 
money. For transactions in dollars, merchants used a fixed conversion rate of $1 = 7 shillings, 6 
pence. Only when prices in the marketplace were typically transacted in dollars would the price 
index reflect the value of dollars in the marketplace rather than the value of some other media of 
exchange. Figure 2 shows that market prices before 1777 were not expressed in dollar units 
beyond that used prior to the first emission of Continental Dollars. As such, the price index is not 
reflecting movements in the value of Continental Dollars pre-1777. After 1776, dollar usage rose 
to dominate marketplace transactions. Thus, after 1776 the price index reflects movements in the 
value of Continental Dollars.
21 
  Lastly, the depreciation tables under the Jefferson heading in Table 2 and Figures 3 and 4 
were created well after the fact, mostly in the early 1780s. How they were created, upon what 
evidence there were based, and whether they were intended to measure the current value of 
Continental Dollars is seldom noted. Their purpose was to establish the principal to be repaid on 
congressional borrowings of Continental Dollars via loan office certificates. Was the principal to 
be repaid the present value at the time of borrowing or the face value? The first depreciation 
table was recorded in Congress on 28 June 1780. It computed "a progressive rate of 
depreciation...in geometrical proportion to the time" starting at face value and running to 18 
March 1780. The starting point was when Congress first borrowed Continental Dollars—late 
                                                 
 
21 Bezanson (1951, pp. 1-11, 25, 332-42). John Adams indicated on 12 October 1775 that Continental 
Dollars were not yet in general circulation (JCC v. 3, p. 491). The evidence in Figure 2 comes from the same 
market, but is different than that used to construct the price index. That dollar statements in Figure 2 post-1776 are 
primarily referring to Continental Dollars can be inferred from the rise in the nominal sums offered for the same 
activities between early 1775 and post-1777. The Philadelphia Merchant Account Book Valuation of depreciation in 
Table 2 and Figures 3 and 4 uses a single account book with questionable assumptions about how to separate war 
effects from depreciation pre-1777.    19
1776 into early 1777. Thus, by construction, these depreciation tables overstate the present value 
of Continental Dollars before mid-1777.
22 
The Collapse of Credible Fiscal Commitment 
By 1778, Congress faced a dilemma. The redemption dates of new emissions, using 
either Forecast 1 or Forecast 2 in Table 2 and Figures 3 and 4, were so far in the future that new 
emissions had little current present-value. The redemption of new emissions could no longer be 
pushed successively into the future. Redemption had to be pulled closer to the present. Doing so 
would cause redemption intervals for prior and future emissions to overlap which, in turn, would 
necessitate capping total emissions to maintain fiscal credibility. In 1779 and 1780, Congress 
attempted to resolve this dilemma. In the process, their actions forced depreciation onto the 
Continental Dollar and precipitated the collapse of the monetary system. 
On 2 January 1779 Congress changed redemption requirements for the Continental 
Dollar. All the structural procedures from 1775 were kept in place except the installment 
amounts and contiguous-year redemption interval.
23  In addition, all past and future emissions 
were to be treated equally, see Table 1 and Figure 1. The states were now to redeem 15 million 
in 1779 and an equal amount each year through 1797, the amount needed to exhaust the 
remainder.
24  While this resolution filled in the missing instructions for the eight preceding 
emissions, it altered the redemption instructions for the first two emissions passed by Congress 
in 1775. 
                                                 
 
22 Boyd (1954, v. 10, pp. 42-3); JCC (v. 5, pp. 845-6, 850; v. 6, pp. 949, 955-6; v. 7, pp. 36, 143, 225; v. 8, 
p. 578; v. 9. p. 955; v. 17, pp. 567-8); Oberg (1998, v. 34, pp. 231-2); Pennsylvania Gazette (19 July 1780). Some 
writers thought that approximately 30 million dollars were required to transact commerce (JCC v. 15, p. 1054; 
Webster 1969, p. 6). They assumed that no depreciation could occur until after that sum was exceeded. Continental 
Dollars did not exceed 30 million until May 1777. Jefferson's table shows depreciation only after May 1777. As 
such, he may have simply assumed that no depreciation was possible before that date.  
 
23 The specie redemption option for citizens at the Continental treasury was not mentioned in the 2 January 
1779 resolution. However, Congress indicated that it was still operative on 14 June 1779 (JCC v. 14, p. 728). 
 
24 JCC (v. 13, pp. 20-1). The 2 and 14 January 1779 congressional resolutions on paper money were 
reprinted in the Pennsylvania Gazette on 27 January 1779.    20
Congress set a $200 million limit for total net new emissions on 1 September 1779 and 
reached this limit on 29 November 1779.
25  Thus, by the end of 1779 the states were required to 
remit 10,277,778 Continental Dollars each year from 1780 through 1797 to the Continental 
treasury to be burned. Eighteen years times 10,277,778 plus 15,000,000 for 1779 equaled 200 
million Continental Dollars. The tax implications of this change placed it beyond what was 
feasible, or historically acceptable, if Continental Dollars were taken at face value. The tax rate 
per capita per year for the 2 January 1779 redemption structure was $6.60 for 1779 and then 
$4.52 for 1780 falling continuously to $2.63 by 1796 (due to population growth).
26 
On 18 March 1780 Congress changed redemption requirements again. States were to 
redeem 15 million Continental Dollars each month over the next 13 months. Thirteen months 
times 15 million equaled 195 million or 97.5 percent of the Continental Dollars ever emitted. 
The remaining 5 million were due in the future from Georgia which, having been invaded, was 
temporarily exempt from sending remittances. The states were also allowed to substitute one 
Spanish silver dollar in lieu of 40 Continental Dollars when filling their quotas. The 18 March 
1780 resolution did not remove the option citizens had to redeem their Continental Dollars 
directly at the Continental treasury for their face value in specie as stated in the 29 July and 26 
December 1775 resolutions and in congressional discussions on 14 June 1779.
27  The tax 
implications of this change placed it well beyond what was feasible, or historically acceptable. If 
Continental Dollars were taken at face value, the tax rate per capita per year would be $79.20 for 
1780. If using the 40 to 1 specie substitution rate, it would still be $1.98. 
                                                 
 
25 Grubb (2008a); JCC (v. 14, pp. 1013-4; v. 15, pp. 1019, 1053, 1171, 1324).  
 
26 That the public and Congress were concerned about the fiscal credibility of these changes is revealed in 
the front-page editorial in the Pennsylvania Gazette, 19 May 1779, and in the address to the public by John Jay, 
President of Congress, 13 September 1779 (JCC v. 15, pp. 1051-62; Pennsylvania Gazette, 29 September 1779). See 
also Sumner (1968, v. 2, pp. 76-7). 
 
27 Ferguson, et al. (1973, v. 1, p. 194); JCC (v. 14, p. 728; v. 16, pp. 262-7). This act was reprinted in the 
Pennsylvania Gazette on 29 March 1780.    21
  The 2 January 1779 and 18 March 1780 congressional resolutions had some good 
consequences. Congress reassured the public that the basic design of the Continental Dollar was 
what the public had been told in 1775. The Continental Dollar was a zero-interest bearer bond 
with fixed future redemption dates. It was to be redeemed through state taxes by those dates or 
exchanged by citizens at the national treasury for specie at its face value after those dates. By 
applying the same redemption interval to all Continental Dollars—past, present, and future—the 
2 January 1779 and 18 March 1780 resolutions also solved the problem of Continental Dollars 
from different emissions trading at different present values in the marketplace. 
Three bad consequences, however, came with the 2 January 1779 and 18 March 1780 
resolutions. First, by changing the redemption dates of past emissions, Congress was passing ex 
post facto laws. This created the possibility that Congress could change the present value of its 
debt obligations at will, creating uncertainty and risk in holding these obligations. Second, while 
the redemption dates for the two 1775 emissions were spread over four-year windows, the 
redemption dates in the 2 January 1779 resolution were spread over a 19-year window. No 
mechanism to determine which Continental Dollar would get redeemed in which year was 
established. A four-year redemption window was a minor inconvenience. A 19-year window 
created substantial uncertainty and forecast error in calculating the present value of Continental 
Dollars. A Continental Dollar in early 1779 could be worth as much as 99 percent or as little as 
34 percent of its face value, see Figures 3 and 4. This problem was solved by the 18 March 1780 
resolution that required complete redemption over the next 13 months, but only by making the 
fiscal commitment to redemption at face value impossible. 
  Third, the 2 January 1779 and 18 March 1780 resolutions established redemption 
procedures that were not fiscally credible, see Table 2. To meet the redemption schedules   22
imposed on the states in 1779 and 1780, or the schedule the states actually did meet in the 1780s, 
tax rates per capita per year had to be well above what had been historically acceptable, and/or 
states had to acquire Continental Dollars at substantially depreciated values. The two years when 
the states remitted the most to the national treasury were 1781 and 1782, namely 53,690,923 and 
24,506,561 Continental Dollars in face value, respectively.
28  The per capita per year tax rates 
needed to raise these two sums, if Continental Dollars were to be retired at face value, were 57.6 
and 26.3 times higher than the average per capita per year tax rate of $0.41 in the colonies for all 
taxes levied between 1770 and 1774. Alternatively, to hold the average per capita per year tax 
rate at $0.41 solely for acquiring the Continental Dollars that actually were redeemed would 
entail acquiring Continental Dollars at depreciated rates, namely 57.6 Continental Dollars equal 
to $1 in specie for 1781 and 26.3 Continental Dollars equal to $1 in specie for 1782. 
  When states set the specie value of new taxes impossibly high then, baring tax revolts, 
citizens had to liquidate goods, land, and bonds (Continental Dollars) to acquire the specie 
needed to meet these new taxes, thereby driving down the specie price of goods, land, and bonds. 
As such, Continental Dollars would trade for specie at rates below their current present-value, 
namely at depreciated rates. The states could now accept Continental Dollars for tax payments at 
these depreciated rates rather than at their present value (at their face value for those reaching 
maturity). In the 1780s, the U.S. experienced deflation in the specie value of goods and land, as 
well as tax revolts related to this deflation.
29  State compliance with congressional changes in the 
redemption of Continental Dollars contributed to this post-war depression. 
  The 2 January 1779 and 18 March 1780 resolutions forced depreciation, as opposed to 
                                                 
 
28 Grubb (2011). 
 
29 See Holton (2007). Alternatively, this outcome could be described as the new state taxes forcing citizens 
to discount Continental Dollars at rates well above the market rate of 6 percent which, in turn, reduced their current 
present-value below their true par value.   23
time-discounting, onto the Continental Dollar. The only way a state could redeem Continental 
Dollars in the amounts required by these resolution was to acquire them at depreciated values. A 
state could not effectively do this without enacting tax codes that violated the legal tender 
equivalence between specie and Continental Dollars in state law for paying state obligations. On 
20 March 1780 Congress recommended that the states revoke the Continental Dollars' legal 
tender status in state law. From late 1780 through mid-1781 the states complied. The Continental 
Dollar monetary system collapsed shortly thereafter.
30 
Ignorance and Confusion 
  Did Congress and the public understand how a zero-interest bearer bond with fixed future 
redemption dates would function as money? Did they comprehend time-discounting? Did they 
know why redemption intervals had to be fiscally credible? Benjamin Franklin knew. On 13 
January 1764, in his longest surviving speech, Franklin explained to the Pennsylvania Assembly 
time-discounting and the role interest rates played when money had a bearer bond structure 
supported only by future redemption dates. On 13 February 1767, Franklin accurately described 
the de facto zero-interest bearer bond structure of the 1733-65 Maryland paper pound. In 1775, 
Franklin advised Congress that the Continental Dollar should pay interest if its present value was 
to equal its face value in contemporaneous transactions, advice Congress did not take.
31 
  As shown in Figures 3 and 4, traders in the marketplace acted as if they knew. This 
outcome may not be that surprising given that there were ample precedents and numerous 
                                                 
 
30 See Laws of the State of Delaware (1797, v. 2, pp. 718-9); Acts of the Council and General Assembly of 
New-Jersey (1784, p. 157); Hening (1969, v. 13, pp. 412-3); JCC (v. 16, p. 269); Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania 
(1904, v. 10, pp. 204-5, 228-9, 247-9, 337-44). Newspaper price currents, merchant account books, and George 
Washington's account book all stopped quoting prices in Continental Dollars in May of 1781 (Bezanson 1951, pp. 
12, 344; Breck 1843, p. 16; Ferguson 1961, p. 66; Webster 1969, p. 502). 
 
31 Oberg (1992, pp. 354-6); Labaree (1967, v. 11, pp. 7-18; 1970, v. 14, pp. 35-8). Pelatiah Webster also 
knew. In an essay published in the Pennsylvania Evening Post, 5 October 1775, he asked in reference to the 
Continental Dollar, "Why should the soldier...be paid in promises, which are not so good as money, if fulfilment is 
at a distance?" (Webster 1969, pp. 1-2).   24
contemporary examples of similar paper monies. The 1733-65 Maryland pound was a de facto 
zero-interest bearer bond. The Connecticut pound from 1755 through mid-1780, the Rhode 
Island pound from 1756 through 1782, the New Hampshire pound from 1760 through mid-1780, 
and the Massachusetts pound from mid-1775 through 1780 all had bearer bond structures with 
fixed future redemption dates—sometimes paying interest and sometimes not—often with the 
redemption dates and interest rates printed directly on the bills. On 18 March 1780 Congress 
asked the states to replace the Continental Dollar with the "Continental-State" Dollar—a state-
specific paper money. Congress designed the Continental-State Dollar to be like the Continental 
Dollar except that it paid interest. Congress acted as if it had finally adopted Franklin's advice 
from 1775.
32 
  Finally, the language printed on the Continental Dollar differed from that printed on the 
paper monies issued before the revolution in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, 
and Virginia. Continental Dollars said on their face, "This bill entitles the bearer to receive [an 
amount in] Spanish milled dollars...according to the resolutions of Congress...." By contrast, 
colonial bills often said on their face, "This bill shall pass current for [an amount] within the 
Province of..."
33  Language mattered and was used carefully. People saw the difference. 
Wholesale ignorance and confusion seem hard to sustain given this evidence. 
  On the other hand, many congressmen who were present in July 1775 later spoke as if 
they did not understand time-discounting nor understood what they had created in 1775. After 
1775, many new congressmen acted as if they were ignorant of what Congress had created in 
1775, or acted as if they did not understand time-discounting and the reasons behind the 1775 
structural design of the Continental Dollar. Only 22 percent of the congressmen who passed the 2 
                                                 
 
32 Grubb (2008c); JCC (v. 16, pp. 264-5); Newman (1997, pp. 99-110, 202-11, 233-40, 387-96).  
 
33 Newman (1997). Italics added.   25
January 1779 resolution, and only 11 percent who passed the 18 March 1780 resolution, were 
present in Congress in July 1775 when the structural design of the Continental Dollar was 
created. In addition, only 25 percent voting on the 18 March 1780 resolution had been present to 
vote on the 2 January 1779 resolution. Thus, ignorance, or a lack of institutional memory, may 
explain a lot of Congress' culpability in the collapse of the Continental Dollar.
34 
  The congressmen who were present in both July 1775 and either January 1779 or March 
1780 were also those who had acted earlier as if they did not understand time-discounting and 
what a zero-interest bearer bond money entailed. The first congressional committee to 
investigate reports of depreciation was formed in November of 1775. It was comprised of John 
Jay, Benjamin Franklin, Samuel Adams, Thomas Johnson, George Wythe, Edward Rutledge, and 
Thomas Jefferson. This committee recognized that Continental Dollars were being accepted at 
below their face value, but the resolution and published announcement that was adopted did not 
explicitly condemn such. It only condemned the non-acceptance of Continental Dollars.
35 
  On 19 April 1776 a congressional committee was created to ascertain the comparative 
value of different silver and gold coins. The committee consisted of James Duane, George 
Wythe, John Adams, Roger Sherman, Joseph Hewes, Thomas Johnson, and William Whipple. 
Thomas Jefferson joined the committee on 24 July 1776. The committee's report, both on 22 
May 1776 and again on 2 September 1776, went beyond its mandate. It offered resolutions that 
said holders of Continental Dollars were entitled to receive their face value in specie from the 
treasury at the future redemption dates appointed by Congress, but also said that Continental 
Dollars must pass current at their face value in specie in contemporaneous transactions. These 
congressmen did not see the contradiction in their report and so were acting as if they did not 
                                                 
 
34 JCC (v. 2, pp. 161-2; v. 13, p. 23; v. 16, p. 267). 
 
35 See fn. 19.   26
comprehend time-discounting.
36 
  The committee's resolution was not acted on until after Franklin left for France. As long 
as Franklin was in Congress resolutions against depreciation did not passed. On 14 January 1777 
Congress finally passed the committee's resolution condemning as enemies those who accepted 
Continental Dollars below their face value in specie in contemporaneous transactions. Of those 
congressmen voting on this resolution, only about a third had been present in July 1775 when the 
Continental Dollar's structural design was created. Looking forward, only 21 and 9 percent of 
those voting in January 1777 would still be present when the 2 January 1779 and 18 March 1780 
resolutions were adopted, respectively. After 1776, the rhetoric surrounding the Continental 
Dollar slid toward the dominant contemporary view of fiat currencies. The Continental Dollar 
was increasingly viewed as just another fiat currency backed by contemporaneous taxes whose 
current value was determined by its quantity in excess of that needed to transaction current trade. 
This rhetoric became the accepted history of the Continental Dollar.
37 
Conclusion 
  The history of the Continental Dollar shaped the debates and decisions at the 1787 
Constitutional Convention regarding monetary powers in the new U.S. Constitution. On 16 
August 1787 the Convention explicitly voted to remove the power to emit paper money, i.e. the 
Continental Dollar, from the list of constitutional powers granted to Congress—a power 
Congress had enjoyed under the Articles of Confederation and in the draft constitutions at the 
                                                 
 
36 JCC (v. 4, pp. 294, 381-3; v. 5, pp. 608, 724-8). 
 
37 See fns. 2 and 36; JCC (v. 2, pp. 161-2; v. 6, p. 1046; v. 7, pp. 35-6; v. 9, pp. 953-8, 989; v. 16, p. 263). 
Congress' continuing ignorance about how the Continental Dollar was designed to work, and failure to comprehend 
time-discounting, is illustrated in John Jay's address to the public as President of Congress on 13 September 1779 
(JCC v. 15, p. 1054; Pennsylvania Gazette, 29 September 1779). In 1780 and 1782, John Adams and Gouverneur 
Morris, respectively, revealed that they either did not remember or did not understand how the Continental Dollar 
that they had participated in creating in 1775 was designed to work (Ferguson, et al. 1978, v. 4, pp. 353-4; Lint 
1996, v. 9, pp. 427-96). In 1781 and 1783, Robert Morris revealed that he did not know, or did not understand, the 
structural design of the Continental Dollar (Ferguson, et al. 1973, v. 1, pp. 149-52; 1995, v. 8, pp. 452-5). See also 
Oberg (1992, v. 29, pp. 354-6); Webster (1969, pp. 1-8).   27
Convention up to that point. The Convention, however, did not recount the history of the 
Continental Dollar or any specifics about Congress' paper-money policies. The delegates offered 
only general statements about "mischiefs" that caused "disgust" with paper money.
38 
  The analysis here suggests that those mischiefs may not have been what many founding 
fathers thought they were. Instead, they were occasioned, in part, by the failure of many of these 
same founding fathers to understand time-discounting and the zero-interest bearer bond structure 
of the Continental Dollar that they, or their peers, had created. The mischiefs that followed from 
this lack of understanding were the passage of ex post facto laws in 1779 and 1780 that changed 
the redemption dates of Continental Dollars, and hence their present value, in ways that were not 
fiscally credible in terms of retiring Continental Dollars at face value.
                                                 
 
38 Farrand (1966, v. 2, pp. 308-10).   28
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